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The COlI is a poem of pity • • • the 
JlDther to millions of Indian man­
kind. •• CcM protection to me is 
one of the JlDst wonderful phenanena 
in human evolution. [1] 
It is a source of puzzled embarrassment 
to many Garrlhian admirers, who otherwise find 
in his thoughts a happy marriage of the JlDre 
sensible of Hindu concepts and the JlDre pro­
gressive of western values, that Gandhi was 
not JlDre JTDdest in his affection for the COlI. 
Yet, it may also be argued, as I intend to 
do, that Gandhi I s bovine peculiarities are 
integral, perhaps' seminal, to the whole of 
his ethical stance; and that a richer urx:l.er­
standing of the Gandhian symrol of the COlI 
will lead to a JTDdel of human/animal ethics 
which may be useful in the west, where the 
present confusion on that issue is despaired 
by the supporters of animal liberation and 
exacerbated by the sociobiologists. 
we make no claim that Gandhi's position 
is representative of Indian culture, for sane 
of the JlDre traditional reasons for venerat­
ing the COlI are absent fran Gandhi's ap­
proach. Despite his enigmatic claim that 
"the central fact of Hinduism is COlI protec­
tion, "[2] Gandhi's COlI is not an especially 
religious beast. He does not linger over 
Krishna's lave for the CCMS, as characterized 
in the Haribamsa and the Puranas; nor does 
Gandhi utili,ze the Shaivite irragery of the 
scholarly and Ferdinand-like bull, Nandi. 
When Gandhi speaks of his "worship" of the 
COlI, one should regard this as an alm:>st 
metaphorical expression and not expect evi­
dence of the Mahabna saying prayers and per­
forming puja in front of cattle or ritually 
garlanding them with flowers. 
Gandhi's veneration of the COlI is also 
not obviously connected with caste restric­
tions on touching defiled arrl polluted mat­
ter, and eating meat. Ordinarily, In India, 
upper caste people do not eat Jreat or use 
leather products, in part because it would be 
ritually defiling to do so; whereas lower 
caste persons JlDre frequently eat meat, and 
sure have as their caste occupations the 
tarming and preparation of hides. Gandhi's 
vegetarianism was based on different notions 
(non-violence and nutritional, rather than 
ritual, purity of the body), and COlI protec­
tion was not a necessary correlation to it. 
For a time during his wayward youth, Gandhi 
was a meat-eater, and later on in life he is 
said to have recarrnended eating meat to sure­
one undernourished for lack of protein, des­
pite the vigorous opposition of sane of the 
upper caste residents of his Ashram at the 
time. [3] Garrlhi also favored the expansion 
of tarmeries, to utilize the hides of cattle 
which had expired through natural deaths. 
Econanic and Political Reasons 
One may argue that instead of sacredotal 
and custClTliU}' reasons for venerating the COlI, 
Gandhi relies fW1damentally on ethical rea­
sons. Yet, before this argument may be made, 
one Trnlst acknowledge that Gandhi also had 
rather practical reasons for regarding the 
COlI with sane deference. 
One of these practical reasons was eco­
nanic. The COlI is a useful and vital part of 
village econauy, and for Gandhi, COlI protec­
tion meant COlI care, the maintenance of cat­
tle as an important econanic unit. Gandhi 
might have vieYJed with sure synq;athy the 
efforts of Marvin Harris to make India I s 
teeming cattle population appear eCO:lanically 
advisable. [4] And Gandhi might also have 
agreed with Alan Heston that the shabby and 
ill-tended CCMS are an econanic nuisance. [5] 
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In general, Gandhi avoided the issue of whe­
ther the CON p:>p.Uation, as presently util­
ized, is econanically advantageous or disad­
vantageous. When Gandhi was presented with 
the argument, in 1925, by an English writer, 
that surplus CXJWS cost Irrlia almost two bil­
lion rupees annually, Gandhi admitted that 
there might be an overall public cost to CON 
protection, but avowed that "a religious 
senti.Ioont is not worth the name if it is not 
worth paying for. II [6] Gandhi's solution to 
the problem was not to kill off the CXJWS-­
which he regarded as being lIOrally rep..1gnant, 
if not impractical--but, rather, to make the 
existing CXJWS econanically useful. 
In fact, the bulk. of Gandhi's writings 
about the CON are essays on the utility of 
rrcdern dairy techniques, and their feasibili­
ty for Irrlia. Yet, such essays are couched 
in rhetoric about the sanctity of the CON. 
"By every act of cruelty to all" cattle, II 
Gandhi writes, "we dis~ God and Hinduism•• 
the miserable condition of our cattle." For 
the proper veneration of the sacred beasts, 
Gandhi is quick to suggest "rrcdel dairy fanns 
and great profitable national institu­
tions."[?] 
It is clear that whatever other ethical 
and personal reasons Gandhi may have had for 
speaking kindly of the CON, it had the prac­
tical effect of stirring Hindu sympathies 
towards scientific dairy techniques. As he 
Md done on many other occasions, Gandhi was 
arousing religious passions in a way that 
would effect social change, in this case, 
econanic change. 
Gandhi's interests in the CON also had 
p:>litical significance, especially in the 
context of Hindu-Muslim relations. The Mus­
lims, after all, were the people in India 
lIOst liable to slaughter CXJWS for beef and 
by-products, and public sentiment anong Hin­
dus for a ban on CON slaughter has always had 
a double edge: the p:>sitive virtues of ve­
nerating the CON and the negative aspect of 
protecting the CON fran its natural enemy, 
the Muslim butcher. It is when Hindu-Muslim 
tensions are at their IJOst taut that the 
issue of CON protection is IJOst visible and 
lIOst visibly dangerous. 
I-bst of Gandhi's wrilings about the CON 
were in the early 1920's and in the mid-40's, 
two m:::m:mts when Hindu-Muslim relations were 
critical. In the 20's, the issue centered 
around. the restoration of the Khilafat and 
the p:>ssibilities of a Hindu-Muslim alliance 
in Congress. In the 40's, it was the rise of 
Muslim nationalism, leading ~ the crea­
tion of Pakistan, and its CO\ID.terpart in 
militant Hinduism. In both of these instan­
ces, Gandhi's camlE!Ilts about CXJWS were meant 
to be words of reconciliation between Hindus 
and Muslims. Gandhi claimed, for instance, 
that "it is the Hindus that do OOIo/'""selling 
business, and not the Musalmans," and hence 
Hindus are really to blame for <::X)W""-slaugh­
ter. [8] '!be Muslim butcher, Gandhi claimed, 
was simply doing his business, and it was up 
to the Hindu cattle merchant to make the 
profession econanically unfeasible. Gandhi 
was adamantly against the legal ban on CON 
slaughter, for"it is obviously wrong legally 
to enforce one's religious practices on those 
who do not share that religion;"[9] rather, 
Gandhi urged an improvement in Hindu-Muslim 
relations as the only viable protection of 
the CON. Similar to the econanic issue of 
scientific CON treatment, the p:>litical issue 
of Muslim attitudes towards CON slaughter was 
made plblically palatable by Gandhi through 
an appeal to Hindu religious sentiment. It 
was a mark of Gandhi's ethical agility that 
he could take a religious notion that usually 
implied narr~ess and prejudice, and turn it 
into a concept of progress and harIJOny. 
Ethical Bases for eo.. Protection 
'!be econcmic and p:>litical importance of 
Gandhi's CON should not, however, deter us 
fran proceeding apace and reaJgIlizing its 
ethical symbolism. There are two levels of 
ethical significance: the obvious linkages, 
which Gandhi made explicitly, and those less 
obvious ethical inferences which we i.rnpJte to 
Gandhi. 
Am:mg the obvious ethical elements, the 
=cept of ahimsa, non-violence, loans IIDSt 
praninent. Gandhi OCIlIll){l1y would alternate 
paragra:fX1g on CON protection with paragra:fX1g 
on the concept of ahimsa, in an alIJOst litur­
gical litany. '!bere is ancient precedent for 
that connection, for although there does not 
appear to be evidence that the concept of CON 
protection emerged at the same time in an­
cient India as that of non-violence, the two 
concepts certainly appear to develop, but­
tressed by each other, during the first cen­
turies of the Christian era. According to w. 
Norrran Br~, "the idea of Ahimsa and the 
doctrine of the sanctity of the CON slowly 
gain status together. •• roughly about the 
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5th century to the 4th century AD." [10] 
What is distinctive about Gandhi's ap­
proach is that ahimsa is interpreted rather 
broadly, to incorporate the ethical concept 
of the unity of all life, and the fX)sitive 
injooction to love one's fellow being. Ac­
cording to Gandhi, "the cow merely stands as 
a symbol, and protection of the cow is the 
least [one] is expected to tmdertake." [11] 
Reverence towards the cow "takes the human 
being beyond his species. •• the cow to lIE 
means the entire sub-human world."[12] For 
Gandhi, cow reverence was a way of expanding 
one's consciousness, of gaining an identity 
with the whole of the created order. 
That wider identity is allied with the 
concept of llRltual love, which also is re­
flected in the symbol of the non-violent cow. 
For Gandhi, non-violence means not violating 
the integrity of another living being. 'ilius, 
Gandhi claimed that, in his opinion, "every 
little breach of the ahimsa principle, like 
causing hurt by harsh speech to any one,man, 
wanan or child, to cause pain to the weakest 
and the most insignificant creature on earth, 
would be a breach of the principle of cow 
protection ••• differing fran it in degree, 
if at all, rather than in kind."[B] 
Mediation Between the One and the Many 
These ethical concepts--ahimsa, respect 
for all life, and llRltual love--are appro­
priate to the image of the cow, but they are 
sanehow insufficient in explaining the dis­
tinctive p:JWer of the cow as an ethical sym­
bol. One has the feeling that the gentle 
kitten, or the magnanimous water buffalo, 
might have done just as well. For Gandhi to 
have written about the cow with such virulent 
ethical p:ission, clearly sore other explana­
tions are in order. For these explanations, 
we will look directly at the cow itself, as 
Gandhi describes it, rather than relying ufX)n 
Gandhi's ethical interpretations. What we 
have foood is that the image of the cow is a 
symbolic JOCdiation between t\\Q different 
basic ethical dilemnas. 
'!he first of those dilemnas is the di­
chotany between the one am the many, the 
tension between the ethical primacy of the 
integral self and the social whole. How does 
the cow resolve this dilemna? On the sim­
plest level, the cow is a resolution of the 
dilemna by being both one and many, the cow 
and many cows. Gandhi persistently uses the 
singular form, as Irrlians frequently do, in 
referring to the cow. And yet, of course, 
there are thousands of cows in Irrlia, each of 
whan partakes in sore way in a generic sa­
credness. To harm anyone cow is to lay a 
hand on the cosmic Mother. 
Moreover, not just the cow itself, but 
one's relationship to it, is a resolution of 
the tension, a holistic act. 'ilie cow, after 
all, is a dtnnb animal, a thing which produces 
doog and pulls plows; and yet it is imputed 
to be also a close relative: our very 
mother. A thing becanes live, personable, a 
related extension of the self. Gandhi ex­
plains this aspect of the cow's symbolic 
nature as our link with all species. It is 
that, but it is also our link with all 
things, and persons whan we might otherwise 
regard as things, by reminding us that even 
the dtnnb cow is our symbolic mother. 'ilie 
otherness of the exterior world is integrated 
with the wholeness of the self. In Martin 
Buber's terms, the "it" hcs becerne a "thou." 
'ilie cow is appropriate for this symbol 
in p:irt because it has been assigned that 
role by being designated the mother cow, the 
personable, self-extended, relative self. 
'ilien too, the role of the cow in the Irrlian 
village also makes this symbol appropriate, 
and vital. The cow is p:irt of the family 
more than any other animal, physically in the 
center of things, its various products essen­
tial to the daily maintenance of the house­
hold, fran the ghee (clarified butter) used 
in cooking, to the dW1g-cakes which are used 
for the cooking fires. 
This image of the cow's role in the 
village is especially evocative for Gandhi, 
who thought of the Indian village as a para­
digm for the harmonious corrrnun.ity. Gandhi 
tended to idealize the traditional village, 
even though he did not live in any, except 
those which he recreated himself. It was in 
the rural p:ice of life, the econanic self­
sufficiency and direct personal relation­
ships, that Gandhi found the closest realiza­
tion of the truthful, non-violent social 
ideal. According to Gandhi, urban civiliza­
tion has no hope W1til it is penetrated with 
"the values of the rural life."[141 'ilie COli, 
then, symbolizes not only the closeness of 
village relationships but also the character 
of the village itself. 
The symbol of the cow is a symbol of 
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psychic unity, a mediation between individu­
alism arrl differentiation, between the perils 
of selfishness on the one hand, arrl loss of 
self on the other. for Jung, the process of 
individuatioo acecmplished that unity, by 
linking the singular, conscious self with the 
universality of the symbols of the collective 
unconscious. '!be symbol of the CCM implies a 
similar process in Gandhian thought, but in 
Gandhi it also is fused with a social dimen­
sion. For as we have just seen, the CCM 
symbolically suggests the wholeness p:>8sible 
in relationships with others, arrl the vil­
lage-like ha.rnony which is the p)tential of 
human camumities. 
~ation Between Authority arrl SUhnission 
'!be other ethical dilemna which is sym­
bolically resolved by the characteristics of 
the Gandhian CCM is the tension between au­
thority arrl sutxaission, freedan arrl re­
straint. This dilenrna was especially acute 
to Gandhi personally, for if we are to accept 
his autobiographical account of his child­
hood, the tension between his father's au­
thoritarian attitu::1es, arrl his rrother's pas­
sivity was a major force in the rrolding of 
his own diverse character, and in the wars 
which were waged within. 
In Gandhi's life history, this tension 
was resolved rrost happily in the role of 
nurse, a task for which Gandhi volunteered on 
several occasions and which he claimed gave 
him enorrrous personal satisfaction. It was 
in the role of nurse that Gandhi tended his 
father in the tratllllatic IlOlleI1ts during his 
father's death. Nursing tasks seduced Gandhi 
into participating in two wars, which other­
wise he likely would not have done. And 
there are many other instances of Gandhi 
playing the role of nurse-to members of his 
ashram, his family, calves, arrl miscellaneous 
animals. 
The nursing role is an interesting resa­
luticn of the tension between authority and 
sul:mi.ssion, because it fully E!11bodies both. 
'!be nurse is in one sense a servant, sutrnis­
sive arrl humbly waiting upon the every need 
of the patient. No king has been so totally 
tended up:m as the patient in the care of an 
obedient and watchful nurse. Arrl yet the 
pitient, in his or her weakness, is totally 
deperXlent upon the nurse, and in that sense, 
the nurse embodies absolute and unlimited 
authority. 
'!be IlOther-image also fits the dual 
roles of the nurse. Even though Gandhi 
viewed his own rrother largely as a pissive 
person, the image of the IlOther in his wri­
tings clearly indicates the power which a 
IlOther may hold, if only by re<:.son of our 
dependency upon her. It is the syrrlrane of 
demanding passivity, which often character­
izes the rrother image of roodern hUllDr: "why 
should you think of me, after all the sacri­
fices I've made for you?" '!be rrother has 
enorrrous control, even-perhaps especially­
in her posture of self-effacement arrl sacri­
fice. Like the nurse, the IlOther is a media­
tion between authority and sutxaission by 
exhibiting both of those characteristics 
si..rrnlltaneously • 
'!be CCM, for Gandhi, is a symbol both of 
the passivity which characterizes the extreme 
of the dichotany, and, in different m:>ods, 
the CCM is the nurse, the rrother, which re­
solves the duality in a passive power. The 
CCM is saretimes offered by Gandhi as the 
perfect symbol of the sutxaissive spirit1 
"CCM worship means to me worship of innocence. 
.the weak and the helpless."[lSl Yet this 
weak and helpless CCM appears, in a renark­
able passage written in 1940, rrore powerful 
than our biological rrothers, through the 
sheer perfection of her sacrificial service: 
Mother CCM is in many ways better 
than the rrother who gave us birth. 
CUr rrother gives us milk for a 
couple of years arrl then expects us 
to serve her when we grcM up. Mo­
ther CCM expects fran us nothing 
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but grass and grain. Our llr::lther 
often falls ill and expects service 
fran us. l-Dther COti rarely falls 
ill. Here is an unbroken record of 
service which does not end with her 
death. Our IIOther when she dies 
means expenses of burial or crema­
tion. r-bther CCM is as useful dead 
as when she is alive. we can make 
use of every part of her body-her 
flesh, her bones, her intestines, 
her horns and her skin. well, I 
say this not to disparage the no­
ther who gives us birth, but in 
order to show you the substantial 
reasons for my worshipping the 
CCM. [16] 
'Ibis unusual passage was quoted in its 
entirety, since it indicates not only the 
dual characteristics of the CCM symbol but 
also sarething of Gandhi's passionate, alrrost 
erotic, expression of it. '!be patently Oedi­
pal overtones, however, simply tm:1erscore the 
ar<J1.I!reIlt; for the classical oedipal pattern 
is also a struggle to resolve the submission 
to the seductive IIOther and the cx:.mpet.ition 
with the authoritarian father. '!be CCM is a 
displacement of those impulses, but also a 
resolution of them; the elements are united 
in the sensual power of the CCM who cares, a 
sensuality which is accessible through our 
worship and devotion, and a power which is 
controllable through our caretaking of the 
cattle. 
These aspects of the CCM are perscrlal to 
Gandhi, but they are not wholly solipsistic, 
for one may argue that the basic approach of 
passive resistance is made out of the same 
stuff. That is, passive resistance is both 
passive and p::JWerful in its resistance; the 
strategic approach is itself, like the CCM, a 
roodiation between authority and submission, 
the loving rother and the angry father. '!be 
coercive and the persuasive elements of pas­
sive resistance lie uneasily together, as 
political observers are quick to point out; 
yet few would deny that they are genuinely 
intertwined, and the one is not simply, at 
least for Gandhi, a ruse to hide the other. 
Nor would many deny that the effect of the 
dual elements is scmething of a fusion, and 
that Gandhi's politics, like his COti, takes a 
posture which is both strong and loving, 
insistent and caring, a posture of concern. 
Elements of a Humane Ethic 
'!be COti symbolism, as employed by Gan­
dhi, therefore has at least three ethical 
elements, which may be st1II1llarized as follows: 
Wholeness: the unity of all life, as 
expressed in the cxmcept of ahimsa, 
which for Gandhi includes the absence of 
harmful intent. 
Personhood: the roodiation between the 
one and the many which results in the 
regard of others as relevant persons. 
Concern: the roodiation between authori­
ty and submission, which results in a 
passive power, expressed as concern. 
'!bese three ethical elements which are 
suggested by Gandhi's imagery of the COti fit 
well into Gandhi I S larger ethical structure, 
and that structure is daninated by a concept 
too sopusticated to be symbolized by a CCM, 
the concept of satya, the ha.nocnious good 
towards which conflicts are resolved in the 
ethical and political process known as satya­
graha. Satyagraha is possible, according to 
Gandhi, cnly when the person performing it 
(the satyagrahi) regards his or her opponents 
with sufficient personhood to be open to the 
possibility of discovering truth within them; 
and then the satyagrahi IIOVes towards the 
truth-......mich is characterized by wholeness-­
with a concern for the integrity of the op­
ponent. 
'!bus, the three elements symbolized by 
the CCM are integrated pieces within the 
larger pattern in Gandhi's ethical thought. 
Nonetheless, the three CCM elements of whole­
ness, personhood, and concern have a certain 
integrity by themselves, a rudimentary state­
ment of basic ethical attitudes. And al­
though Gandhi did not isolate these three 
elements fran the larger context of his e­
thical structure, they are by themselves 
helpful in solving a particular problem, the 
ethics of human!animal relations. 
'!be notion of wholeness provides an 
ethical arena, for it implies that the whole 
realm of relationships anvng the species, and 
within the species, are subjects for rooral 
reflection, and the notion of wholeness 
serves as a gauge of holistic harm::ny against 
which those relationships may be evaluated. 
'!be cxmcepts of personhood and cxmcern are 
the iJrlicators of the integrity of those rela­
tionships. 
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'!his "CXM ethic" of Ganfu.i is sufficient 
to build sound attitudes of humane regard for 
the lesser =eatures. After all, one would 
be unlikely to abuse an animal or to treat it 
ungenerously, if one regarded that animal as 
a perscn with whan one has a relationship of 
concern. Yet, this rather elementary I10ral 
attitude is predicated on one's acceptance of 
the notion of the wholeness of all life, a 
notion which cares easily in the Hindu con-
text, but less easily in the context of the 
West, where it is rurrored that only hurrans 
have been gifted with souls. 
Animal Rights and Animal Liberation 
Thus, in Western philosophy and reli-
gious thought, there has been an ethical 
laCLU1a in the shape of an animal, for there 
has never been any clear-headedness about hC1tl 
animals should-or could--be ethically re-
garded. Western law, secular as well as 
I1Oral, has simply exacerbated the problem 
with the insistance on the concept of rights 
as the principle of legal and ethical beha-
vior. Rather than our relationship with 
animals, it is the nature of animals them-
selves which is at issue in determining whe-
ther they are or are not the sorts of things 
which are deserving of fundamental rights. 
The animal welfare and anti-vivisection 
=usades, which were particularly ardent in 
England in the last century, and which have 
recently surfaced there again, and in this 
country, slip into the same quarrlary when 
they insist up:m "animal rights." [17] '!heir 
arguments appear to be sadly tautological: 
animals are the sorts of things which deserve 
to have rights, therefore they should have 
rights. The problem, of course, is that if 
it were so obvious to everyone that animals 
should have rights, they would doubtless have 
had them. The "animal rights" people are, 
therefore, not arguing out of rational 
principle but waging a crusade, a =usade for 
wider recognition of the rights-worthiness of 
lesser species. 
'!he problem is that rights are assigned 
sanewhat arbitrarily and are always subject 
tc disagreeroont regarding the boundary be-
tween those beings who are worthy of rights 
and those who are not. In earlier genera-
tions, the issue was over slaves and WCIleIl, 
an issue which appears to be finnly settled 
in their favor. Today, the issue is over the 
rights of the foetus and the newly born, the 
unconscious, the CXI'llatose, and the suicidal, 
and the rights of animals. On the horizon 
are the issues of rights to be discussed by 
sane future generation: the rights of rocks, 
and whether trees have standing. [18] 
Perhaps the concept of "animal libera-
tion" might itself be liberated fran the 
burden of an ethic based on rights. An ethic 
of relationships, with its implications of 
responsibility and concord, might be a I10re 
useful place to begin. And for that, we 
might I10destly employ Gandhi and his three-
fold ethic of the CXM. 
A Response to the Ethic of Sociobiology 
However, even if Western ethics and 
philosophy have been negligent in providing 
an understanding about the relationship of 
hurrans with other species, Western science 
has not. Indeed, the theological trem:>r 
which was felt on the occasion of Darwin was 
an indication of the seriousness with which 
the biological explanation was taken. The 
theories of evolution contained the elements 
of an ethic. 
Yet, it has not been until the advent of 
sociobiology that the implications of that 
ethic have becane obvious. Human/animal 
relationships, although taken seriously, are 
no longer of critical issue. In sociobiology 
the genetic dispositions to survival traits 
are assumed to underlie all attitudes and 
activities of humans and other species, in-
cluding those of their inter-relationships. 
At its I10st radical extraoos, sociobiology 
justifies, by its ccrnpetitive survival advan-
tages, certain racist and sexist attitudes, 
and in that justification lies the evidence 
of an ethic, or at least, an anti-ethic. 
'fue starting point of sociobiology and 
the starting point of Gandhi are not far 
apart, however; both begin with the unviolat-
able sense of the unity of all life and the 
conviction that there are cxmron stanjards 
which we should use to gauge all species. 
Gandhi and sociobiology part canpany with 
their choice of standards. And yet ~ere is 
an area of sociobiology's concern which might 
admit sane of Ganfu.i after all; this is the 
paradox that survival may frequently involve 
cooperation as well as <XYnpetition. 
It is a Darwinian paradox that cx:.mpeti-
tion, in sane cases, may vitiate a species' 
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survival, and a:x>peration enhance it. The 
lone aggressive ant, by biting the foot of a 
boar, may signal his presence and find his 
ambitions erased by the scrape of a toe, 
whereas the cooperative ant, in ccncert with 
persevering thousands, could send that boar 
into delirious termination. The point is 
that even by sociobiology's own lindted point 
of reference, the quest for survival, there 
is an opening for an ethic based on a:x>pera-
tion, 1lU.1tuality of trust, and collective 
obligations. 
The basic cow ethic of Gandhi does not 
require 1lU.1ch llOre than that. The virtues of 
wholeness, personhood, and COr1cen1 in rela-
tionships can be understood and even admired 
in species other than our own. Whether these 
are attitudes that are volitional in llOtiva-
tion or are due to biological predisposition 
would surely be debated, but faced with the 
apparent bestialization of human values by 
biology, we can hardly resist the tE!llPtation 
to humanize the acts and attitudes of the 
lesser beasts. 
Whether the cow ethic is indeed the 
ethics of the cow is not, however, a soluble 
or urgent issue. Issues of human/animal 
relations may appear to be both, although 
those issues which are soluble are frequently 
not urgent, and those which are urgent often 
cannot be solved. We have at least in Gan-
dhi 's understanding of the cow the elercents 
of ethical attitooes which, if they do not 
lift the burdens and honor the lives of other 
species, will surely ennoble the lives of our 
own in the attE!llPt. 
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